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Abstract 
A reporting worksheet was developed in 2001 to collect the errors discovered in the 
department.  The worksheet comprised the following variables: body site, machine and 
energy, phase of RT procedure, description of incident, how discovered, date of incident, 
date of discovery, staff member involved in incident and staff member who discovered it 
(only qualification). The personnel was required reporting events explaining the 
importance of safeguarding patients and assuring that no disciplinary trial would be 
opened. Up to 2016 were collected 101 worksheets. 34 in breast treatments, 21 Head and 
Neck (H&N), 9 Chest, 19 Pelvis, 13 bone metastases (MTX), 5 brain. In 2001-2009 were 
collected 37 events, 24 Near Miss (NM), 13 Incident (I), 2 of them harmful. In 2009-2012 
42 NM, no I, 2014-2016 22 events, 21 NM and 1 incident. In 2001-2009 majority of the 
errors was made in prescription phase (12/37), in 2009-2012 in dose-calculation phase and 
transfer phase (19/42). In 2014-2016 the events were balanced in all the phases. Although 
voluntary reporting of errors does not discover all the errors, it permits to improve the 
procedures and to increase a positive culture towards errors. Their distribution among sites 
of treatment, professionals and steps of the treatment pathways is significant different in 
the three periods considered. Collection and analysis of errors may improve patient’s safety 
in radiation oncology. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards, an 
“incident” is any unintended event which includes: 
- operative errors 
- equipment failures 
- initiating events 
- accident precursors 
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- near misses or other mishaps 
- malicious or non-malicious unauthorized acts 
- the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of 
view of protection or safety. 
A “near miss” is defined as a potential significant event that could have occurred as the 
consequence of a sequence of actual occurrences, but did not occur owing to the plant 
conditions prevailing at the time [1]. International safety guidelines [2] have been 
developed and are regularly updated to deal with radiotherapy errors related to equipment 
and dosimetry. There is no consensus yet on how to best deal with errors not covered by 
regular system quality assurance checks. 
After analysing the first 36 erros by means the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) [3] the department kept collecting errors and analysing them in order to 
find weak points in the procedures. 
 
2. MATERIALS 
The staff involved in the Radiation Therapy Department and in the Medical Physics 
Department was invited to highlight every type of incident, committed by him/her-self or 
other colleagues, and to provide a full description of it. The entire staff was assured that no 
blame or liability would derive from incident detection. A reporting worksheet was 
developed in 2001 to collect the errors discovered in our center. The worksheet comprised 
the following variables: body site, machine and energy, phase of RT procedure, description 
of incident, how discovered, date of incident, date of discovery, staff member involved in 
incident and staff member who discovered it (only qualification). For each incident, after 
analysis with the Head of the Medical Physics Department, the Head of the RT Department 
recorded any dose deviation, avoidance of a harmful incident, the need to partially or totally 
change a procedure, or occurrence of harm and its communication to the patient. Once 
discovered, events were classified according to the possibility of: errors avoiding a major 
incident “Near misses”, (NM) or "Incident" (I) the consequences or potential 
consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of protection or safety. 
The collection activity was performed in three periods (2001-2009; 2009-2012, 2014-
2016). The three period were choosed because the 2001-2009 was the period of passage 
from 2D to 3D, 2009-2012 was the period of complete infomatization of the process, 2014-
2016 the period of paperless process and IMRT-VMAT techniques. 
 
3. RESULTS 
Up to 2016 were collected 101 worksheets. 34 in breast treatments (trt), 21 Head&Neck, 9 
Chest, 19 Pelvis, 13 bone palliation, 5 brain. In 2001-2009 were collected 37 events, 24 
Near Miss (NM), 13 Incident (I), 2 of them harmful. In 2009-2012 42 NM, no I, 2014-
2016 22 events, 21 NM and 1 incident. In 2001-2009 majority of the errors was made in 
prescription phase (12/37), in 2009-2012 in dose-calculation phase and transfer phase 
(19/42). In 2014-2016 the events were balanced in all the phases. 
Table 1 shows the distribustion in three periods of the errors according to the treated site. 
(chi-square statistic is 51.9102, the p-value is < 0.00001) 
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TABLE 1 ERRORS DETECTED PER SITE OF TREATMENT AND PER PERIOD  
 
 
2001-2009 
N(%) 
2009-2012 
N(%) 
2014-2016 
N(%) 
BREAST 12(32) 15(36) 7(32) 
H&N 11(30) 6(14) 4(18) 
CHEST 6(16) 3(7)  
PELVIS 6(16) 10(24) 3(14) 
BRAIN 1(3) 3(7) 1(5) 
BONE MTX 1(3) 5(12) 7(32) 
 37(100) 42(100) 22(100) 
 
Table 2 shows the incidents during the time according to the profesional role who made 
them (chi-square statistic is 50.7575. The p-value is < 0.00001) 
 
TABLE 2  ERRORS ACCORDING TO PROFESSIONAL WHO COMMITED THEM 
AND PERIOD  
 2001-2009 
N(%) 
2009-2012 
N(%) 
2014-2016 
N(%) 
Radiation 
oncologist 
16(43) 5(12) 6 (27) 
Physicist 10(27) 21(50) 10(45) 
Technologist 11(28) 12(28) 4(18) 
Nurse   2(9) 
Technical failure  4(9)  
 37(100) 42(100) 22(100) 
 
Table 3 shows the incidente during the time and for each phase or group of phase of the 
radiotherapy procedure  (chi-square statistic is 22.1531,  he p-value is .001136) 
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TABLE 3   ERRORS ACCORDING TO THE PHASES OF TREATMENT AND 
PERIOD  
 2001-2009 
N (%) 
2009-2012 
N(%) 
2014-2016 
N(%) 
Prescribing treatment protocol 12(32) 6(12) 7(32) 
Planning and treatment 
information transfer                       
10(27) 21(50) 8(36) 
Position and immobilization/ 
simulation imaging and 
volume determination 
8(22) 5(12) 3(14) 
Patients set up and treatment 
delivery 
7(19) 10(24) 4(18) 
 37(100) 42(100) 22(100) 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Reducing the rate of errors occurence is an important activity in order to maximize safety 
of patients. There are several methods to improve quality of radiotherapy treatment by 
means of reducing errors: proactive ones which analyze the processes and try and renforce 
the weaker point of the procedure; retrospective ones which collecting and analizing errors 
tray and correct the procedures. 
The department were coached to deal with errors considering them a source of infomation 
about malfuntioning in the acivity. Operators were always invited not to hide error or 
malfunctioning but to referr them to the master of the department.   
 Risk analysis by means of HFACS showed that a majority of incidents were due to 
inadequate supervision (unsafe supervision level), while others were due to a deficiency in 
the rules (resource/acquisition management level) and required correction of some 
procedures. [3] Obviously  system of errors collection cannot intecept all the errors while 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) associated with incident learning can reduce 
much more the errors and incidents occurrence.[4]  A systematic collection and analysis 
od inicident among different centers may result in reducing errors over the time. [5] 
 The most significant result of activity has been the change in culture of the staff  
which accepted to freely  report incidents  without fear of reprisal.  
The three period were choosed because the 2001-2009 was the period of passage from 2D 
to 3D, 2009-2012 was the period of complete infomatization of the department, 2014-2016 
the period of paperless activity and IMRT-VMAT techniques introduction. In 2009-2012 
here was a turn-over of prsonel among the physics and medical staff. In the first period the 
number of I was higher (13), nothing in the intermediate period and 1 in last period. 
Considering that the analysis may bring to change procedure if it appears unfit or weak to 
avoid a new similar error, the fall of incident number could depend on the increased skill 
of the staff during the years and  on the improvement of the procedures ought to errors 
analysis. 
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The statistical analysis shows a significant difference in the distribution of the errors among 
sites of treatment, professionals and steps of the therapeutic pathway over the time.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The monoinstitutional experience of incident learning during sixteen years shows that 
collection and analysis of errors may improve the safety of patients in radiotherapy, 
reducing incidents and stimulating a safety culture in the staff. The practice shows a 
modification of pattern of detected errors suggesting a sort of pressure of the activity of 
collection and analysis on the beahviours and the procedures. The number of incidents was 
lowered from the beginning to le more recent periods, and patterns of errors were 
significant different according to sites, professionals and steps of radiotherapy pathway. 
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